Final Thoughts – 2013 Draft

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Published on: April 29, 2013

Now that the draft is over, it’s time to post some final thoughts.

Thought #1: The rest of the league should be terrified of the quarterback situations the Broncos, Falcons, and Saints have put themselves in. Not only do they all have established veterans to run the offense, but they all picked up quality in the late rounds of the draft or free agency that they can develop. Scary.

Thought #2: Sad to hear that Ryan Aplin had some sort of issue passing a physical. I hope this isn’t the end for him because I think he’s incredibly talented.

Thought #3: Good to see Brent Leonard getting some tryouts. Kick the door in when you get that opportunity, man. Here’s to good things happening for you.

Thought #4: This tight end class will be very interesting to watch since my predictions are so far away from everyone else’s. I might have to revisit those predictions at the end of next season.

Thought #5: Oh you poor, sweet Jets fans. Good luck with all that. In all seriousness, good luck. I would be very happy to be wrong in this case. I just don’t think I am.

First Round Thoughts

Only five players that I have a number attached to were drafted in the first round.  This will be short…until we talk Vikings.

Pick #8:  Tavon Austin

The first wide receiver off the board is also my top rated wide receiver, for whatever that’s worth.  Not much to say here other than I think the Rams made the right choice.

Pick #16:  E.J. Manuel

The first quarterback taken in the draft goes to the Bills.  I like the pick in that I think he will do well in the NFL.  Our handy-dandy math equation tells us to expect Manuel to have a 74.79 NFL Passer Rating by the time his rookie contract is over.  I think Bills did well here.  They avoided the Geno Smith hype and got an interesting playmaker.  It will be interesting to see if they transition to a read-option offense or if they use E.J. as a more traditional quarterback.  I think they could do either.

Pick #21:  Tyler Eifert

I am not a fan of Tyler Eifert, at least as far as pass catching ability goes.  I think I might be alone in that opinion, but I’ll follow the numbers.

Pick #27:  DeAndre Hopkins

I have my wide receivers sorted by Completions Away from Average (CAA).  If you look at that list, you see Hopkins somewhere near the middle of the pack.  But I think that number doesn’t capture his true value.  One of the reasons I really hesitated about posting my wide receiver rankings is that the model really loves slot receivers.  This makes sense for two reasons.  First, slot receivers tend to be matched up against the 3rd or 4th best defensive back in the secondary.  They are working against the less talented, relatively speaking, members of the secondary.  Second, slot receivers typically run shorter routes than the guys on the outside do., so the throws are, relatively speaking, easier.  Combine those two together, shorter routes against the lesser talented defensive backs and you get a combination that loves completions.  So if you look down the list, a lot of slot receivers are at the top.

On the flip side, outside, deep receivers are punished by the model.  The passes are longer and more difficult to complete and are against higher quality defenders.  Given that, it is quite good for a receiver like Hopkins to get to #27.

Pick #29:  Cordarrelle Patterson

Here we go.  Now we’re going to get wordy and mildly upset.  I want to open by saying that I’m not upset with the outcome of this pick.  Cordarrelle Patterson may turn out to be an excellent wide receiver.  Or he may not.  Either way, that’s not what I’m upset about.  This isn’t about Cordarrelle Patterson being the “right pick” or not.  This biggest issue Vikings fans like myself should have about this pick is the process that brought it about.

I’ve read this argument in many other places (see Wages of Wins, Sloan Conference, etc. etc. etc) but it bears repeating here.  Sports are very outcome focused.  We talk endlessly about a particular player being the right fit or a can’t miss prospect, but that is the wrong way to think about the draft.  We should not be concerned about outcomes.  We should be concerned about the processes that are generating our outcomes.  Processes are what gets you sustained success.  Outcomes get first downs and touchdowns.  Processes build dynasties.  I don’t like the process that the Vikings used to make the 29th pick because it doesn’t reflect the reality of the draft.

What realities to I mean?  As economist Cade Massey says, the draft is dominated by randomness.  Predicting NFL performance from college data is remarkably difficult.  Even my own model only predicts 11% of the variance in NFL Passer Rating.  That’s very far away from lights out, sure thing picking.

Error Bars for my Quarterback Predictions

And even if you get it right, there is a chance your guy could get injured and all your perfect forecasting could be for not.  Massey goes on to recommend that in an environment dominated by tremendous uncertainty, your best option is to use as many selections as possible.  This is where the Vikings fell down horribly.

The teams that use the draft properly are teams that have accepted the random nature of the draft and act accordingly.  What you absolutely do not do is sacrifice three picks to move back into the first round.  There is absolutely no guarantee that this pick will work out well.  There is no guarantee that any pick will work out well.  It is a massive roll of the dice to give up all those picks and absolutely the wrong process to use in the draft.  The Patriots, our trade partner, are a team that gets the process right.  They accept that the draft is largely random, move back in the draft, add additional picks and wait for some of them to work out well.

That’s my breakdown of the first round.  Here’s hoping the Vikings hit on the selections they have remaining.  I think they gave up far too much to make a third first round pick.

Data Drop: Before the Draft Edition

Categories: NFL Draft, Statistics
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Published on: April 21, 2013

The 2013 NFL Draft is less than a week away.  All the draft analyzers are putting in their final push to get everything in order for the big day.  In the spirit of getting everything in order, I’ve added a load of new data to the site.  Check the Draft Numbers menu for everything.

I’ve added my entire list for wide receivers and pass receiving tight ends.  I’m a bit scared of putting that up, actually.  There was a time when I said I wasn’t going to do that.  I’m scared because I don’t have a good metric for understanding what these numbers predict.  The numbers are an indication of the pass catching talent of that player separate from the quarterback and offensive scheme.  However, I don’t think the numbers will predict receiving yards or touchdowns at the end of a season.  My major project for the summer will be to connect these numbers to something more meaningful and concrete, like I have with quarterbacks.  Until then, we can just look at the nice pretty list.

One note, the tight end data refers to pass catching ability only.  There are many other factors that make a quality tight end other than being able to catch passes, most notably blocking ability.  The tight end list only ranks tight ends on the single measure of pass catching.

Tweaking the Model

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Published on: April 14, 2013

Apologies for the unexpected hiatus last week.  I had to fly to Seattle for a wedding.  But now I’m back in the Frozen Tundra and ready to tell you about some stats.

I’ve been adjusting the statistical methodology I use in the last couple weeks.  Nothing has changed about how I calculate the Completions Away from Average metric, but I have been changing how I use that metric to predict NFL success.  Be advised that this is another post that is heavy on technical details.  If you are not a technical reader, the take-home point of this post is that the changes will make my predictions better in the long term, but add more uncertainty in the short-term.

Change #1:  Dependent Variable

The DV I’ve been using for predicting is NFL Passer Rating after three years in the league.  I chose three years arbitrarily.  I thought, “Well…most draft prospects have a decent chance of playing after three years in the league, and we don’t want to get too far away in time from college because we can’t account for growth and coaching, so let’s use three years.”  Arbitrarily isn’t the best reason to choose a DV, so let’s use something with a little more meaning.  I’m going to stick with Passer Rating as it’s a reasonably good per-attempt statistic.  The per-attempt part is what I really care about.  Yes, there are problems with it, but I think the good outweighs the bad.

But choosing three years as an arbitrary time-period doesn’t make much sense.  We don’t have to change this much to make it meaningful, but we should change it.  Rather than Passer Rating after three years in the league, I went with Passer Rating after four years in the league.  Four years is much more meaningful because it is the length of all rookie contracts under the new CBA.  Thus, I’m predicting what a player is most likely to do during his rookie contract.  I think that is much more meaningful than what I was doing previously.

Change #2:  Prediction Model

Changing the prediction model solves two problems, which is handy.  When I have two problems, I like being able to solve them both at the same time.  So what are the two problems that need solving?

Problem #1:  Adding Data

The typical method of designing a statistical model is you have some theory, you collect data in a way to test that theory, and you use the data you collected to create a mathematical formula that minimizes the errors between your theory and the data.  In most cases, my statistical model included, the mathematical formula is fairly simple.  We draw a scatterplot of our data, and draw a straight line through the cloud of data points.  Then all we need is our 8th grade math skills to solve for the important values of that line, y = mx + b, where m is the slope of the line and b is where the line crosses the vertical axis (a.k.a. intercept).  We also know x, in this case Career CAA, for each individual player, so we just solve for y, in this case Passer Rating after four years in the league, and we have our prediction.  This process is called regression modeling.

But then what?  New players will always be entering the NFL.  Also, some of the players that I have in the model haven’t been in the league for four years, so their data will change.  But that’s not a problem, right?  We just keep collecting the data and everything should get even better, right?

What I’m about to say might surprise some of you that are not familiar with traditional methods of statistical modeling.  Continually adding data and using traditional regression techniques will actually make your predictions worse.  Regression models hate adding new data.  They want to take the information you give them the first time and do the best they can with it.  When you take the same model, feed in the old data plus some new data, the model is more likely to follow blind alleys and tell you that unimportant things might be useful predictors.  So the realities of the NFL make traditional modeling techniques less useful.

Problem #2:  Distribution of the DV

Traditional regression assumes a normally distributed dependent variable.  For most things, this is fine.  For Passer Rating this is not fine as passer rating isn’t normally distributed.  In a normal distribution, most cases are in the middle with a few cases on the high and low ends.  However, a per-attempt statistic like passer rating isn’t normally distributed because some quarterbacks won’t have many attempts.  For example, let’s look at Ryan Mallet this year.  He had 4 attempts this season, one of which was intercepted.  Now, the passer rating metric just takes what it has and extrapolates from that information.  The number that is Ryan Mallet’s 2012 passer rating assumes he would throw an interception every 4 attempts, which we humans know is not true.  If he was on the field and made 100 attempts, he wouldn’t expect him to throw 25 interceptions.  To our brain, that’s ridiculous.  But the math equation doesn’t know this.  It’s just taking what we gave it and spitting out a result.  So Ryan Mallett’s passer rating is currently 5.  Some players, like Mallett, have really poor numbers.  Other players, like Kirk Cousins, have really good numbers. We shouldn’t believe either number just yet because they haven’t had enough attempts to get a good picture of what they can do when they are on the field.  This is the nature of the beast in the NFL; some quarterbacks have passer ratings that are extreme compared to others.  But regression models don’t like extreme values.  Regression models like everything to be nice and normal.  Extreme values confuse the model and exert undue influence on the final result.

Solution:  Bayesian Robust Linear Regression

I won’t say too much about the Bayesian portion of this.  When I start talking Bayesian methods in class, my students tend to glaze over like fully fed zombies.  Baaaaaayes.  Regardless, the Bayesian portion solves Problem #1.  Bayesian analyses are built to accept new data in ways that traditional regression models are not.

The Robust Linear Regression part is the really cool part.  In this analysis, we can change the assumption about the distribution of our DV.  We can, for example, assume our values are distributed as a t-distribution, which means most of the values are in the middle, but extreme values are expected and dealt with easily.  So, let’s revise the predictions with this analysis.

New Model

We will set some very general prior predictions before we run the analysis.  We will assume that our DV is distributed as a t-distribution.  We will also assume that possible intercepts and slopes are distributed normally.  The analysis will calculate which degrees of freedom by estimating a value called tau.  Tau is conceptually, but not quite the same as degrees of freedom.  It’s a measure of how fat the tails are.  The closer to 0 this is, the better this analysis will do compared to traditional techniques.  If tau is > 30, we shouldn’t see much difference.  We assume possible values of tau follow a gamma distribution beginning at 1.

So what do we find?  Note, we’re using 4-year NFL passer rating as our DV rather than 3-year as in past analyses.

Tau

The first question is if we made a wise choice in assuming our dependent variable is t-distributed rather than normally distributed.  Our most credible estimate of tau from these data is 2.56.  Remember, the closer to 30 this is, the less this matters.  Since the most credible estimate is much, much less than 30, we should improve our predictions substantially with this procedure.

Equation of the Line

We’re still trying to find a line that best predicts our outcomes.  Bayesian regression is a little different in that it gives us lots of different lines that are all credible given the data we have.

In the initial estimates, we have a small sadness.  0 remains a credible slope.  This is what I meant above about increasing uncertainty in the short term.  There is a chance that everything I’ve been talking about is not true and this CAA metric isn’t worth anything.  The nice thing about Bayesian analyses is that they put a probability on this chance.  Given the data we have, there is about a 6% chance that I’ve been blowing smoke at you this entire time.  I’m willing to keep going with that, but you can make your own decisions regarding that.

To create the actual equation, I took the most credible intercept and the most credible slope and stuck them in the same equation.  Note that I’m still new to Bayesian estimation techniques and I’m not quite sure if this is kosher or not.  If I find that it’s not, I will revise the model.

New Equation for Prediction

4-Year NFL Passer Rating = 70.5 + 0.143 * (Career NCAA CAA)

I’ve added a new column to my predictions for the 2013 draft class.  Note that this doesn’t change their relative rankings any, just the estimate of their NFL passer rating four years from now.

“You’d think after 7 or 8 you’d start to go, ‘Maybe it’s me.’”: Franchise Problems

The title of this post is the punch line of my favorite Ron White joke.  He’s describing a woman who claims to have had bad sex with more than 2,000 airmen.

I’m using the joke as a metaphor for NFL teams that seem to be constantly drafting quarterbacks.  How many times will certain teams have to draft an apparently talented quarterback only to see him waste away before they take a hard look at themselves and say, “Maybe it’s us”?

I’ve actually been kicking this idea around for a while now.  I just didn’t have a proper story to couch the numbers in.  But today I was listening to the latest Wages of Wins podcast with Eric Weiss of Sports Aptitude.  He was discussing how some basketball teams seem to draft really well.  He wasn’t talking about teams that are able to recognize talent and drafted accordingly.  He talked about how some NBA teams draft to create an environment.  He cited the San Antonio Spurs as an example of a team that appears to follow this strategy.  The Spurs seem to draft with an eye to the individual player, how that player will fit within the system, and if the player’s personality will respond to the role they are asked to fill.  Most important for our purposes, he talked about what teams can do to ease the transition when new players enter the system.  It isn’t easy to be uprooted from everything you’ve known as a 22 to 25 year old and be placed in an entirely new place with the only constant being that you’re still playing a sport.  There are really important things you have to learn that have nothing to do with the sport you are now playing professionally.  Where is the good grocery store?  Can you still access your bank accounts?  Where are you going to hang out on your off time?  What do you do with all this money you suddenly have?  And now we’re going to add to that the constant scrutiny and publicity that comes with being a professional athlete?  Anyone that can thrive with that sort of uncertainty, uprooting, and pressure certainly deserves our respect.

But are there some NFL teams that could improve in this regard?  Are there teams that constantly seem to be getting less of a return on their drafting investments compared to others?  Who should be looking at easing the transition to improve the outcomes of their newly drafted players?  If you’ve been reading my site, you know that I claim I can separate the impact of the quarterback from the impact of wide receivers.  I can tell you whether or not a quarterback is succeeding because he is a great quarterback (Aaron Rodgers) or because he has a great set of receivers to throw to (Andrew Luck).  Same with struggling quarterbacks.  Do they struggle because they are having trouble putting the skills together (Ryan Lindley) or because their receivers just aren’t up to the task (Christian Ponder).

Using the same methodology, I can also separate the impact of the quarterback from the impact of the franchise.  The problem is, I can only do this for teams that change quarterbacks.  In the NFL, when things are working they don’t change.  I suppose that’s true for a lot of places, but I care most about the NFL.  So I can’t tell you whether the Patriots are really good at creating an environment for Tom Brady to excel or if Tom Brady would succeed in any environment.  The Patriots haven’t changed quarterbacks in a long time so there is no way for me to tell you that.  But I can tell you about the struggling teams.  The immediate, reactionary move for any struggling team is to change the quarterback.  This gives us some very useful information.  I can quantify how much the issue associated with the franchise is hurting the quarterbacks that play there.  So not only can I say, “Yeah, it’s you.”  I can say, “And this is how much it’s you.”

The data included in this analysis are from the 2007 to 2012 seasons.  Please note that I can’t give you exact reasons for why these teams seem to have poor environments.  Also, each team might have a different reason or its poor environment.  I don’t know.  I’m not close enough to these teams.  I just know that the data say that the problems are not entirely at the quarterback position. In reverse order, the top 5 teams that need to improve their environment for quarterbacks.

#5:  New York Jets      

Expected Reduction in Completion Percentage – 3.29%

The Jets love to rabble rabble rabble about their quarterback situations.  Mark Sanchez is the latest victim here.  Jets fans:  It’s not his fault.  At least, not all of it.  Mark Sanchez would likely really benefit from a change in scenery.  The Jets, though, not so much.  I doubt they would fare any better by drafting another quarterback.  These guys they keep bringing in new quarterbacks to “push” Mark Sanchez aren’t doing anything.  I think we need to accept that playing for the Jets just isn’t that great for a quarterback’s career.

#4:  St. Louis Rams    

Expected Reduction in Completion Percentage – 3.46%

We’ve come a long way from the “Greatest Show on Turf.”  Since the Super Bowl years of the early 2000’s, the Rams have had a hard time getting any quarterback to stick.  Sam Bradford was supposed to be this great success, but he’s had his struggles.  Struggles that are only magnified after he signed the last massive rookie contract ever.  But I say the issue is not with Bradford.  Everyone loves to pick on Sam Bradford for not being the huge success he “should” be by now.  Without the St. Louis drag on him, Sam Bradford is as accurate as Tom Brady.  Think about that.

#3:  Carolina Panthers    

Expected Reduction in Completion Percentage – 4.99%

A surprise franchise comes in at #3.  Carolina hasn’t been the greatest team in the last six years, but they haven’t been the worst either.  They seem to have a quarterback now that can get them where they want to go, and even before that they had talented players at the position.  I would really like to dive into the data and study more about what might be pulling Carolina down so low on the list.  Only problem is that would involve me moving to Carolina to work for the Panthers, and I don’t think that’s in the cards.

#2:  Oakland Raiders    

Expected Reduction in Completion Percentage – 5.00%

Our last two entries on our list are teams that go through quarterbacks like Kleenex.  The first is the Oakland Raiders.  Many quarterbacks have tried to turn this team around.  All have failed.  And it would appear that unless something drastic happens, quarterbacks drafted by the Raiders will likely continue to whither.  I’ve been hearing rumblings of Geno Smith being mock drafted to the Oakland Raiders.  It might be kinder just to break the dude’s legs right now.

#1:  Cleveland Browns    

Expected Reduction in Completion Percentage – 5.37%

You knew it was coming, Cleveland fans.  The train wreck that is Cleveland Browns has seen quarterback after quarterback try to save this thing.  None of it is working and I think the franchise really needs to take a hard look at what they do off the field before they bring in yet another quarterback.  They need to help their players in a way other than talent evaluation.  And I truly believe Cleveland has been drafting talented quarterbacks.  Especially the last two.  Brandon Weeden and Colt McCoy are loved by my draft model.  But just like Ron White’s airbase lady, when your partner doesn’t have it going on, every one of them seems like a bad…

Gone Analyzun

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Published on: March 25, 2013

Need buks
Kant estimate one p’rameter
Bak next week

In all seriousness, I don’t have anything new to report. Amazon willing, I’ll have my useful book by the end of this week. Once I have that, I can report the results of a cool new approach to predicting quarterback success. Until then…Gone Analyzun

The Way-Back Machine: JaMarcus Russell

Categories: NCAA FBS, NFL, Statistics
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Published on: March 17, 2013

Blizzard permitting, I will be standing in front of an Introductory Psychology class lecturing on the topic of intelligence on Monday.  The major point of the lesson will be that intelligence is a combination of ability, on the one hand, and the skills and motivation to use that ability on the other.  Both influence outcomes on intelligence tests about equally.  It’s not just intelligence we see this pattern for.  Many outcomes we label “talent” or “God-given ability” can be broken down statistically into an inherited, biological component and a skills and motivation component.

Which brings us to JaMarcus Russell.  The narrative about Russell is that he is a classic case of a highly talented individual lacking the skills and motivation to put that talent to use.  Pundits point to his arm strength and success in college as indicators of his talent, while his numerous issues both on and off the field as indicators of his lack of work ethic, poor motivation, etc.  Even now, four years after his last played down of professional football, we seem to be paying attention to his apparent comeback.  We talk of how great an “untapped” talent he still is.  If only he could get the motivation component under control.  But untapped talent tends to remain so.  Without the skills and motivation necessary to unlock such talent, that talent will remain hidden and useless.

So what do the data say?  Was JaMarcus Russell tapping his potential in college before his unfortunate demise in the NFL?  Before we answer that question, some caveats.  JaMarcus Russell was one of the first players I was interested in looking at once I realized I had a useful model for predicting success at the NFL level.  But there are problems.  First, I cannot analyze anything before 2005.  An important piece of data, incomplete pass targets, was not recorded in any form prior to then.  So there are points in JaMarcus Russell’s career that we simply can’t analyze.  Second, the limited amount of data limits our ability to separate JaMarcus Russell’s ability from the impact of play-calling, skills of the typical defense faced, etc., etc., etc.  Essentially, we are limited how well we can separate Russell from program-level factors.  This is an especially difficult problem for evaluating Russell because Les Miles began his tenure at LSU in 2005.  We can’t correct for the influence of Les Miles in these early data.

So once again, data.  The table shows JaMarcus Russell’s Completions Away from Average for the 2005 and 2006 NCAA season as well as totals.  Remember that 0 CAA is average.

Year
Name
CAA
Predicted
2005JaMarcus Russell-11.703
2006JaMarcus Russell12.825
Total1.12265.9

Even though we only have two seasons of data, note the wild inconsistency across these two seasons.  In 2005, he had a poor season but in 2006, he had a pretty good season.  The combination of the two gives us a prediction of his passer rating after 3 years in the NFL of 65.9.  His actual NFL passer rating after 3 years in the league was 65.2, a phenomenal prediction for this model given the limited data it’s working with.

So, was JaMarcus Russell a tremendous college talent that flamed out because of poor work ethic.  Not really.  He did exactly what we should have expected.  He was inconsistent in college and ultimately should have been labeled as an average NCAA quarterback.  Sound familiar?

The bigger question is, how did evaluators get it so wrong with JaMarcus Russell.  I can only speculate about that, but I think evaluators were seduced by what they saw outside of actual games.  JaMarcus Russell can throw a football a long way and is “naturally gifted,” according to Jeff Garcia, so what if he is somewhat mechanically inconsistent and has some sideline issues?  It would appear that, at least in JaMarcus Russell’s case, it matters a great deal.

Correction to Previous Post

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Published on: March 12, 2013

I mentioned last time that I was going to run a full ANOVA on the data from my post last time, including some nice confidence intervals and post-hoc tests.  Well, I did that and made these graphs.

This one for Career Receptions

This one for Career Yards

This one for Career Touchdowns

I looked at these graphs and noticed something hinky.  The confidence intervals for rounds 5, 6, and 7 overlap.  That can’t be if I have a significant ANOVA like I reported in the last post.

So I spent some time checking over my calculations and noticed an error.  My sum of squares calculation was pointed at the group standard deviation instead of the group mean.

Upshot of the whole thing?  The points at the end of the last post about the 7th round being better than the 6th are incorrect.  Instead, we see our expected pattern, a J-shaped distribution consistent with random selection of talent coupled with self-fulfilling prophecy associated with draft round.  Once we control for playing time, we should see no differences in performance across rounds, which we can begin to evaluate using Yards per Game Started

Career Wide Receiver Production: 7th Round Darlings

Categories: NFL Draft, Statistics
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Published on: March 10, 2013

People say that the quarterback position is the most difficult to project into the NFL.  I respectfully disagree.  Certainly, the quarterback position is difficult to project from the college to professional game, and we’re not very good at it.  The empirical evidence shows decision makers are essentially making a random guess when it comes to projecting quarterbacks.  The only reason first round picks seem to have better numbers is because decision makers expect them to be good and provide them more opportunities – a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But there are worse things in this world than randomly guessing.  You will be right sometimes if you’re randomly guessing.  More than that, if you keep guessing randomly over and over and over again – say once a year every April since 1936 – the number of times you’re right and the number of times you’re wrong should be essentially equal.  Random decisions are not the worst possible outcome.  It is entirely possible that you could be on the other side of random.  It’s possible to make decisions that are worse than what a random process could achieve.  Sometimes we could make better decisions if we started throwing darts while blindfolded.

As an example, consider how most lay people buy stocks.  Most people don’t want to lose their money in the stock market.  They want high performing stocks that are going up.  So they don’t buy a stock until it starts going up.  And the average person doesn’t want to be burned by market fluctuations, so they continue to watch the stock as it goes up more.  Once the stock gets sufficiently high, they buy the stock.  But this is precisely the worst time to buy the stock.  The stock has nowhere to go but down from this point and the investor is more likely to lose money.  The person would be much better off picking stocks at random because the information they are using is leading to worse decisions.

How does this relate to football?  Football decision makers drafting wide receivers and lay people picking stocks have a lot in common.  To be clear, I have no idea what information football decision makers are using when predicting wide receiver success in the NFL.  Others have studied this (that one is a pdf, be aware if you click on it) and found inconsistent results.  However, just because I don’t know the process doesn’t mean I can’t evaluate the outcomes the process generates.  So let’s do that.  Let’s evaluate wide receiver draft picks and compare that with what we would expect given a random process.

The Evidence

I started with another study of the Hall of Fame.  It seemed to work well for the quarterbacks, so why not go back to the well again?  Where were the consensus great wide receivers drafted?  Here is a histogram of all wide receivers in the Hall of Fame that played since 1945.  Dante Lavelli is not on this graph as the U.S. Army drafted him before the NFL got a chance.  Remember, a random process coupled with a self-fulfilling prophecy will create a J-shaped distribution.

If we delete Raymond Berry as an extreme outlier, the histogram looks like this.

Here we have our first strange finding in the wide receiver data.  For picks 1-80, the data show the expected pattern.  A nice J-shaped pattern as we get further on in the draft.  But what is going on with picks 81-120?  There is a strange increase in Hall of Fame receivers drafted at a point corresponding, in modern times, to the late 3rd through the 4th rounds.  This is our first evidence that wide receiver evaluation is not just random, but biased in the wrong direction.  However, it is far from conclusive.

This pattern is strange enough to demand a more complete analysis of wide receiver production.  Perhaps the bump in the late 3rd through 4th rounds represents the perceived value of the wide receiver position.  We can be reasonably sure that everyone wants a quarterback and is willing to draft their favorite quarterback with the highest pick possible.  However, the same might not be true for wide receivers.  It’s possible that wide receivers are not as highly valued compared to quarterbacks and are not taken with the highest draft pick possible.

To attempt to rule out that explanation, I took Berri and Simmons’s methodology that they used for quarterbacks and applied it to wide receivers.  Let’s examine career production for all wide receivers drafted between 1995 and 2009.  We will look at Career Receptions, Career Yards, and Career Touchdowns.  I chose to start at 2009 because the average career length of an NFL wide receiver is just a shade over 3 seasons.  Any receiver drafted in 2009 is already at the average career length for an NFL wide receiver.  I chose to stop at 1995 because it includes 15 years of data, which is a nice round number, and it was midnight when I finished entering the 1995 data and I wanted to go to sleep.  All data was downloaded from pro-football-reference.com.

The first graph shows the Average Career Receptions for a wide receiver drafted during each round of the draft during the 15 year time period we are looking at.  Unless otherwise specified, I deleted all players that were never credited with catching an NFL pass.  I have run these numbers keeping all players, and the pattern is exactly the same.  Remember that this analysis does not control for playing time, so we are expecting a J-shaped distribution.

Here is a similar graph showing Career Yards

And the same graph showing Career Touchdowns

In all three cases, the data from Rounds 1-5 show the expected pattern.  There are still players drafted in the later rounds that are making an impact, but the impacts tend to be less than those drafted earlier.

However, that wasn’t the really weird part.  The really weird part was what happened in the final two rounds.  I might not have thought much of it if I hadn’t run the Hall of Fame data first.  Let’s zoom in on career production only for players drafted in rounds 5, 6, and 7.

Here is Career Receptions

Here is Career Yards

Here is Career Touchdowns

Wide receivers drafted in the 6th round have, on average, less productive careers compared to wide receivers drafted in the 5th and 7th rounds.  This is true if we measure production based on receptions, yards, or touchdowns.  One-way ANOVAs using only players drafted in the 5th-7th round confirms this, all F’s > 15.90.  My home set up is not great for running ANOVAs, which is why I did this slimmed down version.  Next week I will put all players into an ANOVA and run some splashy post-hoc tests.  Until then, we’re stuck with this slimmed down analysis.

This is a crazy finding.  Compared to receivers drafted in the 6th round, receivers drafted in the 7th are working against the self-fulfilling prophecies of decision makers, coaches, and their quarterbacks.  They should, by all accounts, have worse careers.  And yet, they have the more productive careers than players drafted in the 6th round and are just as productive as receivers drafted in the 5th.  My first explanation for this finding was that receivers from non-FBS schools are more likely to be drafted in the 7th round.  That was not the case in this data.  80.95% of 5th round draftees, 72.5% of 6th round draftees, and 81.81% of 7th round draftees come from FBS schools (Remember we deleted receivers that either did not make a team or did not catch an NFL pass).  At the very least, this isn’t a question of source school .

What should we conclude from this?  I think we have some very clear evidence that talent evaluators should stay away from wide receivers.  The pattern at the top of the draft is consistent with a random process.  I can’t conclude it is random right now because I don’t have good numbers on wide receiver playing time.  However, the pattern is consistent with randomness coupled with self-fulfilling prophecies.  Given what we know about the randomness of selecting quarterbacks, there is no reason to assume that wide receivers would be any different.

The pattern at the lower end of the draft is even more compelling.  In this case, talent evaluators and draft decision makers are consistently wrong about players evaluated as 7th round talents.  Those players are, on average, just as good as players evaluated as 5th round talents and better than players evaluated as 6th round talents.

This leads me to believe that we simply do not know what makes a productive wide receiver.  Furthermore, something about how we evaluate wide receivers is leading us to make worse decisions.  If we could control for the self-fulfilling process effect, we might see lower rated receivers doing BETTER than higher rated wide receivers.  (see This Post for explanation of the correction)

Which ultimately leads me back to my two favorite predictions for this wide receiver draft class, Cody Wilson from Central Michigan and Brent Leonard from Louisiana-Monroe.  Both of these receivers had extremely productive college careers at schools that don’t get a lot of media attention.  Both of them are not rated highly by the draft community for physical reasons – Cody Wilson because he is short for an NFL receiver and Brent Leonard because he is “not fast.”  But I ask you, who cares?  Fast receivers do not do any better than slow ones.  And prioritizing fast receivers might be leading us to draft worse receivers in the high rounds.

Remember, when I started this I said I don’t know what process evaluators are using to grade wide receivers.  However, after looking at the data, I am confident that they should stop whatever it is they are doing.  The decisions being made late in the draft are worse than randomly guessing.  At the end of the day, decision makers would be better off throwing darts at the names of draft eligible wide receivers blindfolded.

On Communication

Categories: General Info
Comments: No Comments
Published on: March 6, 2013

It’s a rare weekday post from me.  I’m updating now rather than my normal weekend posts because I think the topic of conversation is fading rapidly.  I want to get my two cents while the iron is still slightly warm.

I mentioned last time that I Twittered into the Sloan Conference last weekend.  Since that time, the panel that seems to have had the most legs beyond the conference is the panel on communication.  Commentators have gone on at length about the good information that was in that panel essentially saying that quantitative people need to be concerned about how they are presenting their ideas.  In classic terms, this was the “thesis.”

Then people started mulling over the thesis and I saw some reactions against that line of thinking.  Some people saying that communication is a two way street and the burden is not solely on the quantitative people in the room.  Front office people also need to be learning rudimentary statistics to help facilitate that communication that they are looking for.  We can call this the “antithesis.”

My goal in this post is to provide some synthesis.  Let’s combine these ideas to see what we can take forward.  I often find that when I’m trying to communicate with non-analytic people, the issue is a difference in mindset.  I don’t mean to imply that every individual within these two general groups thinks in this way.  However, I do believe that the general tendencies exist and are worth mentioning.  What might Front Office People and Quantitative Analysts not know about one another that could be inhibiting this communication?

Front Office People – You need to understand that quantitative analysis is a process of pointing out what’s wrong.  Every day I show up at work and think up some ideas.  I spend the rest of the day trying to find a way to demonstrate that those ideas are wrong. If I don’t do this, my colleagues will do it for me when I present, or my peers will do it when I try to publish my ideas.  I have literally sat in a room while a friend and colleague asked me a series of questions that had the possibility of invalidating six entire years of work.  We don’t do this to each other because we’re assholes.  We do this because it is the quickest way to the best answer.  The idea is that if we spend all of our time, energy, and brain power on ripping down this idea, whatever can’t be ripped down must be worth pursuing.  The entire process of analysis is a process of falsification.  Always remember, when you pay an analyst to run some numbers you are paying them to tell you that you are wrong.

Analysts – There is a reason so many of us are depressed alcoholics.  The constant falsification and focusing on what we’ve done wrong rather than what we’ve done right is not a typically healthy mindset to be in.  Most of the rest of the world does not think this way.  It hurts to be reminded that we’re wrong.  We analysts have a pretty thick callus over that particular spot, but most don’t.  Most people want to be reminded that they are right.  They want to be affirmed and given positive reinforcement.  As analysts, we have to be very concerned with how we frame our responses.  The old clichéd story about the dream interpreter comes to mind.  The “your dream means your children will all die before you vs. your dream means you will outlive all with eyes on your thrown” thing.  The first interpretation gets the interpreter killed while the second gets the interpreter a cushy job and some treasure, but they are both the same interpretation.

Here is the message that I got from the communication panel.  Framing answers is what will truly separate the successful analysts from the unsuccessful ones.  The analysts that will continue to have jobs are the artists who can continuously tell powerful people they are wrong and still keep the powerful people happy.  That is not a trivial skill.  It takes effort and patience to reframe our traditional ways of thinking for those that aren’t as familiar with them.  And from the non-analyst side, analysts aren’t assholes, even though we might talk like we are sometimes.

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